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In 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower began what has become
one of the longest standing economic embargoes this country has ever had
against another country.' In 1964, President John F. Kennedy continued
what president Eisenhower started, and strengthened economic sanctions
against the Cuban government. 2  The sanctions passed by President
Kennedy prohibited almost all direct commerce between the United States
and Cuba.3 In February 1996, a Cuban MiG-29 fighter jet shot down two
unarmed United States civilian planes in international airspace, killing all
four individuals on board.' In response to this unprovoked attack by the
Cuban government, President William Jefferson Clinton signed into law
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996
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1. Digna B. French, Comment, Economic Sanctions Imposed by the United States Against
Cuba: The Thirty-Nine year Old Embargo Culminating with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 7 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1998).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Implementation of the LIBERTAD Act, 7 U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch 15 (Apr. 8,
1996). See also U.S. and the UN Respond to Cuban Shootdown of Civilian Aircraft, 7 U.S.
Dept. of State Dispatch 11 (Mar. 11, 1996) (reacting to the incident and discussing unilateral
actions taken).
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(Helms-Burton) on March 12, 1996.1 This piece of legislation is the focus
of this article, and is the focus of great debate in the international
community. Since its inception the Helms-Burton Act has created a
surplus of commentaries, law reviews, and symposia concerning certain
titles of the Act, in particular Titles III and IV.6 The stage is now set for
President George W. Bush to inflict the final blow on the Cuban regime,
and sign into law Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, which many legal
scholars believe would end Castro's tyranny.7 This article suggests that
suspending Title III from the Helms-Burton Act renders the Act as nothing
more than political gesturing, and simply a mere extension of the 1959
Trade Embargo currently in place. Indeed, if the current administration
wants to see an end to the Castro regime, it must be proactive in its
approach towards Castro, and not succumb to the political pressures being
applied by their trading partners.
Part I of this article analyzes the four provisions of the Helms-Burton
Act, closely scrutinizing Title III, which allows United States nationals to
file lawsuits against any foreign investors who traffic8 in illegally
confiscated property within Cuba. Part II of this article examines whether
the Helms-Burton Act is in line with international law in light of harsh
criticism and non-support from the international community. Finally, part
III of this article examines whether United States courts have jurisdiction
based upon the "effects" doctrine which grants countries the right to
exercise jurisdiction with respect to activity outside of the state, but have
or intend to have a substantial effect within the state's territory. 9 This
article concludes that the Helms-Burton Act is a legal, effective, but
unutilized tool to strengthen the Cuban embargo, bring an end to Castro's
hegemonic regime, and be the final piece of a forty-year-old puzzle giving
every Cuban-American a country free from tyranny.
5. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-14, 110 Stat.
785 (1996) (codified 22 U.S.C. § 6021-6091) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
6. See Jorge F. Perez-Lopez and Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Helms-Burton Law and
Its Antidotes: A Classical Standoff7, 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 95 (2000).
7. See David M. Shamberger, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: A Legal and Effective
Vehicle for Redressing U.S. Property Claims in Cuba and Accelerating The Demise of the Castro
Regime, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 497 (1998).
8. "Traffics as used in Tite III, and except as provided in subparagraph (B), is someone
who sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages,
uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property." 22 U.S.C.A. §
6023(13) (2001).
9. See Antonella Troia, Comment, The Helms-Burton Controversy: An Examination of
Arguments that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 Violates U.S.
Obligations Under NAFTA, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 603, 608 (1997).
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I. HELMS-BURTON ACT OF 1996 ANALYZED
The Helms-Burton Act's explicit purpose is to assist the Cuban people
in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining the
community of democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western
Hemisphere,'0 to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro
government," and to provide for the continued national security of the
United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro government
of terrorism, theft, and political manipulation of the desire of Cubans to
escape that results in mass migration to the United States.' 2  The Act
further seeks to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections
in Cuba conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized
observers,'3 to establish a policy framework for United States support to
the Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition government
or a democratically elected government in Cuba. 4 Finally, the Act aims to
protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the
wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.-
Title I, "Strengthening International Sanctions Against the Castro
Government""1 calls upon the President of the United States to advocate
and instruct the permanent representatives to the United Nations to seek,
within the Security Council, a mandatory international embargo against the
Cuban Government." Further, Title I combines incentives and
consequences to achieve a democratic government in Cuba.'" Section 101,
entitled "Statement of Policy," makes it clear to the international
community, and in particular to the Castro government, any threat of
national security posed by the operation of any nuclear facility will
culminate in a backlash of consequences against the Castro government.'9
10. Helms Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6022 (1996).
11. Id. § 6022(2) (1996).
12. Id. § 6022(3) (1996).
13. Id. § 6022(4) (1996).
14. Id. § 6022(5) (1996).
15. Helms Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6022 (6) (1996).
16. Id. § 6031 (1996).
17. Id. § 6031(2) (1996).
18. French, supra note 1, at 8.
19. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, at § 6031 (1996). The President should do all in his
power to make it clear to the Cuban Government that (a) the completion and operation of any
nuclear power facility, or (b) any further political manipulation of the desire of Cubans to escape
that results in mass migration to the United States, will be considered an act of aggression which
will be met with an appropriate response in order to maintain the security of the national borders
of the United States and the health and safety of the American people. It is beyond the scope of
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In essence, the goal of Title I is to apply economic pressure to the Castro
government by restricting imports from Cuba into the United States.
Further, Title I does not allow any American people or companies to
invest, supply loans, credits, or any other form of economic help for the
Castro government.20
Title II of Helms-Burton Act, "Assistance to a Free and Independent
Cuba," calls upon the United States to provide assistance to a transitional
government in Cuba.2' This Section formally states that the United States
will form solidarity with the Cuban people, to provide appropriate forms of
assistance to a transition government in Cuba, and to facilitate the rapid
movement from such a transition government to a democratically elected
government in Cuba, that results from an expression of the self
determination of the Cuban people.Y The provisions of this Section will
take effect upon a determination by the President of the United States that a
transition to democracy is taking place in Cuba." Among aid the United
States will provide to Cuba, once a democratically elected government is in
place, shall be items such as food, medicine, medical supplies, and
equipment to meet emergency needs to protect the basic human rights of
the Cuban people.2
Keeping the provisions of Title I and Title II in mind, we turn now to
the 1959 Trade Embargo, and compare the provisions of that Embargo
with the Helms-Burton Act. The 1959 Trade Embargo calls upon the
United States to prohibit all direct commerce between the United States
and Cuba; block all assets in the United States belonging either to Cuba or
to Cuban nationals, including freezing bank accounts; rescind Cuba's
"most favored nation" status; and ban aid to any country which provides
assistance to Cuba.2 In comparing Title I and II with the 1959 Trade
Embargo, there does not seem to be a great deal of distinction between the
two. Quite frankly, the first two titles of the Helms-Burton Act are simply
an extension of the 1959 Trade Embargo, because the objectives of both
are to isolate Castro's government and prevent countries from supporting
this article to explore the consequences which will occur if Cuba maintains and operates a
nuclear power plant within its country.
20. French, supra note 1, at 8.
21. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6061(11) (1996).
22. Id. § 6061(5) (1996).
23. Helms Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6062 (a)(1) (1996). "The President shall develop a
plan for providing economic assistance to Cuba at such time as the President determines that a
transition government or a democratically elected government in Cuba as determined under
section 203(c) is in power." Id.
24. Id. § 6062(b)(2)(A)(1) (1996).
25. See French, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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the communist regime. It is not until reading the provisions of Title Ill
and Title IV that a clear distinction is marked between the two statutes.
Title III has received the harshest criticism from the international
community.6 Title III of the Act, entitled "Protection of Property Rights
of United States Nationals" states that
any person that traffics in confiscated property for which
liability is incurred under paragraph (1) shall, if a United
States national owns a claim with respect to that property
which was certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission under Title V of the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949, be liable for damages computed in
accordance with subparagraph (C).27
In essence, this title protects United States property that has been
wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban government and resold in an effort to
stir economic re-growth for the Castro regime. However, the re-growth
comes at the expense of the rightful owners who are United States
nationals, or have become United States nationals as a consequence of
fleeing the communist country. It is this title that gives the Helms-Burton
Act not only distinction from the 1959 Trade Embargo, but clearly places a
strain on the Castro government by making any and all individuals or
corporations trafficking confiscated property in Cuba, subject to a lawsuit
by the rightful owners of that property.
This article is not opposition to Section 306, granting the President
power to suspend the effective date of Title III for a period of six months,
provided that the President states in writing that the suspension is
necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba.2 This article, however, is in opposition
to the manner in which Section 306 has been used to appease countries
engaging in the very acts that Helms-Burton opposes. This presidential
power has been used consecutively since the signing of the Helms-Burton
Act, 29 first by President William Jefferson Clinton and more recently by
President George W. Bush. ° President Bush stated that he hopes by
26. See Jonathon Ratchik, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 11
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 343 (1996).
27. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6082(a)(3) (1996).
28. Id. § 6085(b)(2) (1996).
29. See Associated Press, Bush Suspends Law on Cuba Lawsuits (July 16, 2001), available
at AOL: APO/Bush-Cuba/. See also Peter Morton & John Geddes, Ottawa Spurns Clinton
Move: Suspension of Helms-Burton Lawsuits Dismissed by Eggleton, FIN. POST, Jan. 4, 1997;
Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Hold Up Cuba Suits, Pleasing Few, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1997.
30. d.
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suspending Title III it will encourage a movement toward democracy on
the island.,' However, President Bush fails to state what events or steps
the Castro government has taken that would support such a statement.
Since Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959 he has
trampled on the fundamental rights of the Cuban people,
and through his personal despotism, has confiscated the
property of millions of his own citizens, thousands of
United States nationals; and thousands more Cubans who
claimed asylum in the United States as refugees because of
persecution and later became naturalized citizens of the
United States. 32
The Castro government has not given any indication it is willing to change
its form of government,3 and has openly referred to democratic pluralism
as "pluralistic garbage."' 4  President Clinton and President Bush have
consequently suspended more than 6511 lawsuits that have been filed under
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.33 There is no question the President has
the authority, pursuant to Section 306, to suspend the right to bring a
lawsuit under the title. However, there has been strong criticism against
both President Clinton and now against President Bush by the Cuban
American leaders and supporters.36  By suspending Title III the Helms-
Burton Act, we are left with a mere extension of the 1959 Trade Embargo,
the rest of the Act becomes superfluous.
Finally, Title IV of the Act, "Exclusion of Certain Aliens," gives the
Secretary of State the power to deny a visa, and the Attorney General the
power to exclude from the United States, any alien who has confiscated
property of United States nationals or who traffic in such property.37
Opposition to Title IV is also based on the notion that denial of visas to
executives of corporations, as well as denying visas to their families, is an
over extension of United States law, because the denial is solely based on
the executives trafficking in property outside of the United States.38
Further, countries such as Canada and Mexico argue that Title IV is a
31. Id.
32. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6081(3) (1996).
33. Id. § 6021(3) (1996).
34. Id. § 6021(16) (1996).
35. See Troia, supra note 9, at 605.
36. Associated Press, supra note 29.
37. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6091 (a) (1996).
38. See Shari-Ellen Bourque, Note, The Illegality of The Cuban Embargo in the Current
International System, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 191 (1995).
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violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to which
the United States is a party. 39 Both Canada and Mexico have been very
vocal about their opposition to the Helms-Burton Act, and argue that the
Act violates Chapter Eleven of NAFTA which requires that each NAFTA
signatory treat investors of other NAFTA signatories with the "most
favored nation" principle.40
In light of these harsh criticisms by the international community, it is
essential to understand that Congress did not zealously draft this
controversial piece of legislation without first finding sufficient reason to
do so. Consequently, it is essential now to look at some of the findings
that led to the drafting of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. Congress makes
the following finding:
(3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it
will not engage in any substantive political reforms that
would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an
economic recovery. (4) The repression of the Cuban
people, including a ban on free and fair democratic
elections, and continuing violations of fundamental human
rights, have isolated the Cuban regime as the only
completely non-democratic government in the Western
Hemisphere. (5) As long as free elections are not held in
Cuba, the economic condition of the country and the
welfare of the Cuban people will not improve in any
significant way. (6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro
regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful
means to improve their condition and has led thousands of
Cuban citizens to risk or lose their lives in dangerous
attempts to escape from Cuba to freedom.41
39. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 2022, 107 Stat. 2057, 32
I.L.M. 296, 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
40. See Troia supra note 9, at 607 n. 26. The "most favored nation" is a term that
requires "each party shall accord to another party treatment no less favorable than that it accords,
in like circumstances to any other Part of a non-party with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments." NAFTA, supra note 39, at 639.
41. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6021 (1996). There are several other findings
Congress made prior to the drafting of this Act which further solidify the foundation upon which
the Helms-Burton Act is not only justified, but necessary. Among those omitted from the body
of the text are (1) The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of at least 60 percent in the
last 5 years as a result of (A) the end of its subsidization by the former Soviet Union of between
5 billion and 6 billion dollars annually, (B) 36 years of communist tyranny and economic
mismanagement by the Castro government; (C) the extreme decline in trade between Cuba and
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These and several other findings are the basis upon which the Helms-
Burton Act is not only justified, but required.
In spite of such findings, opponents of the Helms-Burton Act are still
overly critical of both Title III and Title IV.' 2 In Section 301 of Title III of
the Helms-Burton Act, Congress has found "it is in the interest of the
Cuban people that the Cuban Government respect equally the property
right of Cuban nationals and nationals of other countries."' 3  Congress
further finds that
individuals enjoy a fundamental right to own property
which is enshrined in the United States Constitution." (2)
The wrongful confiscation or taking of property belonging
to the United States nationals by the Cuban Government,
and subsequent exploitation of this property at the expense
of the rightful owner, undermines the comity of nations,
the free flow of commerce, and economic development.'4
The Cuban Government has unlawfully confiscated property that rightfully
belongs to United States nationals, and has turned around and offered that
property to foreign investors in an effort to stimulate economic growth
within the country."6 The Helms-Burton Act merely affords those
individuals who have been deprived of their property the right to redress
their loss in the just courts of law. Yet, because of politics and economics,
countries continue to oppose the Helms-Burton Act, and have sufficiently
manipulated our leaders to suspend Title III.
II. HELMS-BURTON AcT IS IN LINE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Chief trading partners with the United States have vehemently
opposed the Helms-Burton Act, and argue that Helms-Burton does not fall
in line with international law.' 7 Consequently, many countries have
adopted several "antidotes" to counter the effects of the Helms-Burton Act
in an effort to make it clear to the international community that acts by the
the countries of the former Soviet bloc; and (D) the stated policy of the Russian Government and
the countries of the former Soviet bloc to conduct economic relations with Cuba on strictly
commercial terms.
42. See, e.g., Bruce W. Nelan, Taking on the World, TIME, Aug 26, 1996, at 26. See
also Troia, supra note 9.
43. See Perez-Lopez & Travieso-Diaz, supra note 6, at 102.
44. Helms Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6081(1) (1996).
45. Id. § 6081(2) (1996).
46. Id. § 6081(5) (1996).
47. See generally Shamberger, supra note 7.
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United States government will not go unopposed.u However, the Helms-
Burton Act is in full compliance with international law, and the United
States has the proper right to enact such laws that protecting the national
security of the United States as this Act does. 9
Critics of the Helms-Burton Act argue that it violates provisions of the
General Assembly on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).- In particular, the very
purpose of the GATT agreement is to encourage its contracting parties to
"enter into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce. "' On
its face it would seem that Helms-Burton is in violation of the GATT
agreement, however, within the GATT agreement itself, there is a
provision providing an exception when the security interests of the country
are at stake. 2 The security exception to GATT which reads as follows:
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed (a) to require
any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential
security interest; or (b) to prevent any contracting party
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essentials security interests.-"
The United States, and frankly the international world, has a strong
national security interest in being free of the cronyism of the Castro
government. It is part (b) of the GATT exception which the United States
can use to justify whatever violation of international law may be claimed
by the European Union under the GATT agreement. The national security
interest that the United States would claim is a product of the atrocious act
by the Cuban government of shooting down the two civilian United States
planes in international airspace, which killed four people.4
However, it is clear that opponents to the Helms-Burton Act do not
share this view of national security interest. In fact, the European Union
has been the chief advocate against the Helms-Burton Act, and has
encouraged investors to blatantly ignore the Helms-Burton Act and invest
48. See Perez-Lopez, supra note 6.
49. See The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXI
[hereinafter GAIT].
50. See Ratchik, supra note 26.
51. See Shamberger, supra note 7, at 528.
52. Id. at 508.
53. Id. at 537 n. 84.
54. See Implementation of the LIBERTAD Act, supra note 4.
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in any properties in Cuba." In essence the European Union is telling its
investors to outright ignore the interests of the United States, ignore the
fact that Castro has taken properties that rightfully belong to United States
nationals, and invest in those properties. Further, the European Union
investors shall ignore the continual Human Rights violations that occur in
Cuba; and justify their actions by passing resolutions posturing a political
stance, which in actuality are nothing more than political jargon.'
The European Union has been quite vocal in its opposition to the
Helms-Burton Act -because it would affect the pocket of many of its
investing companies. However, it is not quite as vocal in its opposition to
the continual human rights violations that occur within Cuba, "while the
[European Union] called for a peaceful transition to a pluralistic
democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Cuba,"
it never indicated that trade and investment with Cuba would be
conditioned upon advancements in these areas." The European Union,
along with countries such as Canada and Mexico, are concerned with the
Helms-Burton Act not because of the "unhealthy precedent" that it will
set, but rather because it will affect them economically.
Opponents to the Helms-Burton Act argue that to permit Helms-
Burton is a direct violation of the obligation the United States has under the
NAFTA to treat all members with "most-favored-nation" status 3 In
pertinent part, NAFTA states, "each Party shall accord to investors of
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of a non-Party with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments."10 Further, Canada
and Mexico argue that Helms-Burton violates Chapter Sixteen of NAFTA,
explicitly requiring all parties to NAFTA accord temporary entry of
business persons to the respective countries.61  Canadian and Mexican
investors argue that Title III, which allows lawsuits to be brought against
those investors who deal in confiscated property in Cuba, and Title IV,
which denies entry to the United States for those investors and their
family, frustrates the very purpose of Chapter Eleven and Chapter sixteen
55. Shamberger, supra note 7, at 509.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 509.
58. Id. at 508.




of NAFTA.6 However, the United States has several arguments that
would not only allow but justify the United States enacting Title III, and
maintaining Title IV of Helms-Burton, without violating any provision of
the NAFTA agreement.
The United States can rightfully claim, under Article 1110 of Chapter
Eleven of the NAFTA agreement, one of the member countries can
prohibit other country members from taking measures that directly or
indirectly expropriate an investment of a NAFTA country.61 Clearly, the
Canadian or Mexican investor who traffics in confiscated United States
property is in direct violation of Article 1110, and it is therefore justified
for the United States to take measures that would prohibit these investors
from profiting from confiscated property. The very purpose of Article
1110 is to allow other member countries from being handcuffed in
situations such as this. The Canadian or Mexican investor is willfully and
knowingly trafficking in properties that were wrongfully confiscated by the
Cuban government. The United States has no other recourse but to
exercise its right under Article 1110."
Next, the United States can rightfully deny Chapter Eleven benefits to
any of the member countries, if it finds that Canadian or Mexican investors
maintain investments that are owned or controlled by investors of a non-
NAFTA country with which the United States maintains no diplomatic
relations, or against which it maintains economic sanctions.63 The
government of Cuba is not a member of the NAFTA agreement, and the
United States, which is denying benefits to the Canadian and Mexican
investors, maintains economic sanctions against the Cuban government. It
does not matter that the investment comes from Canada or Mexico,
because the investment is administrated or run in Cuba, and therefore the
rules and laws of the Cuban government control what occurs with the
investment.6
Finally, the United States can use Article 2102, which allows any one
of the NAFTA member countries to take a contrary position to the
agreement if it feels that national security interests are being threatened.67
62. See Troia, supra note 9, at 606-07.
63. See NAFTA, supra note 39, at 641 (governing payment of compensation when an
investment is appropriated).
64. See Troia, supra note 9, at 616.
65. See NAFTA supra note 39. at 642 (authorizing denial of chapter eleven benefits).
66. See Troia, supra note 9, at 616.
67. See Troia, supra note 9, at 616-17.
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As described earlier in relation to the GATT agreement," the United States
has a national security interest in protecting its citizens from ruthless
attacks on the part of the Cuban government. The Cuban government can
only thrive and continue if countries such as Canada and Mexico continue
to openly invest in the country, providing the Cuban government with the
hard currency necessary to maintain the government running." It is
contrary to the national security of the United States to have a country,
which is only ninety miles away and is hostile to the United States,
continue to receive economic support by the very countries with which the
United States is suppose to have strong trading ties." Therefore, it is in
the interest of United States national security to implement legislation such
as the Helms-Burton Act that will dismantle the Cuban regime which has
shown time and again its dislike for the United States., Clearly the United
States has ample justification for the implementation of Title III of the
Helms-Burton Act and the maintenance of Title IV, without dealing with
the issue of whether or not the GATT agreement or the NAFTA agreement
are violated. The United States has an obligation first and foremost to the
citizens of the United States, irrespective of whether the Mexican and
Canadian investors are in agreement with the manner in which that
obligation is carried out.
III. THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE PERMITS THE UNITED STATES TO
IMPLEMENT EXTRATERRITORIAL LEGISLATION
It is argued that the Helms-Burton Act violates international law
because it is an unjustified extraterritorial application of United States law
against foreign countries.72 Opponents to Helms-Burton argue that it is an
extraterritorial legislation because it seeks to require foreign countries and
their nationals to comply with the United States embargo against Cuba, or
68. See GATT, supra note 49.
69. See Troia, supra note 9, at 616.
70. See NAFTA, supra note 39 at 639.
71. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6031 (1996). It is the sense of the Congress that
(4) in view of the threat to the national security posed by the operation of any nuclear facility,
and the Castro government's continuing blackmail to unleash another wave of Cuban refugees
fleeing from Castro's oppression, most of whom find their way to the United States shores,
further depleting limited humanitarian and other resources of the United States, the President
should do all in his power to make it clear to the Cuban Government that (a) the completion and
operation of any nuclear power facility or (b) any further political manipulation of the desire of
Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United States, will be considered an act of
aggression which will be met with an appropriate response in order to maintain the security of
the national borders of the United States and the health and safety of the American people.
72. See Troia, supra note 9, at 637.
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face the possibility of a lawsuit in a United States court." The United
States recognizes in international law five basis for jurisdiction prescribed
by international law. The five bases that the United States recognizes for
jurisdiction are as follows:
1. Territoriality: Entails the notion that countries are
free to regulate and exercise jurisdiction over conduct that,
wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory.
2. . Nationality: Permits a country to exercise
jurisdiction over the status of persons, or interests in
things, present within its territory.
3. Protective: Recognizes the right of a state to
punish a limited class of offenses committed outside its
territory by persons who are not its nationals-offenses
directed against the security of the state or other offenses
threatening the integrity of governmental functions that are
generally recognized as crimes by developed legal systems.
4. Passive Personality: Asserts that a state may apply
law-particularly criminal law-to an act committed
outside its territory by a person not its national where the
victim of the act was its national. 4
The fifth basis, the effects doctrine, is discussed within this article.
The United States can rightfully claim that under the "effects doctrine" of
the Restatement, legislation such as the Helms-Burton Act is in compliance
with international law because the foreign investments in Cuba have a
substantial effect within the United States.75 The effects doctrine reads in
pertinent part:
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct that wholly, or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or
interests in things, present within its territory; (c) conduct
73. Id. at 637.
74. Id. at 640.
75. See Troia, supra note 9, at 640-42 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402(3)(d) (1986)).
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outside its territory that has or is intended to have a
substantial effect within its territory. 6
The effects doctrine has on prior occasions been used to address cases
dealing in anti-trust, securities, and environmental protection. In such
cases, United States courts have held that conduct between foreign
companies on foreign soil could nevertheless subject them to United States
jurisdiction if there are effects in the United States." Knowing that the
effects doctrine is a vehicle by which the United States can get around
violating international law, it is important to note that under Section 403 of
the Restatement, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when
the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.7" Clearly the question
then turns to what exactly the legislature means by reasonable. In Section
403(2) the legislature provides a non-exhaustive list which describes the
several factors that must be considered when trying to determine if a
particular piece of legislature is reasonable.'9 The United States should
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
77. See Shamberger, supra note 7; Timberlane Lwnber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alwninwn Co., 148 F. 2d at 444
(2d Cir. 1945).
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
79. The Restatement (Third) states:
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) The link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) The connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity, to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect:
(c) The character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.
(d) The existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) The importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) The extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) The extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
and
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argue that subsection (a) of Section 403(2) is a good example of why it is
reasonable to implement Helms-Burton. Under subsection (a) the
regulating state, i.e., the United States, has to demonstrate that there is a
link between the activity and the territory wanting to regulate the activity.'0
The United States is trying to regulate the activity of countries that are
trafficking in illegally confiscated property. The justification for doing so
is that there will be a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon the
United States if it continues to allow countries to traffic in United States
properties illegally confiscated by the Cuban government."I To continue to
allow the Castro government to taint the titles of properties that rightfully
belong to the United States nationals, would create an insurmountable
problem for the United States down the line in the claims resolutions.82
"The clouds on titles created by these purported valid transfers to
traffickers of other nationalities would, at the very least, delay and
complicate the task of settling the valid property claims of United States
nationals through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission."' 3 This
purported action by the Castro government would create a substantial
effect on the United States, and would thus justify the provisions of Helms-
Burton, in particular Title III. This is not to say that based on subsection
(a), and it alone, would the United States reach the reasonable standard
that was discussed earlier in Section 403 of the Restatement. It is clear
that there is some form of a totality of the circumstances approach by the
legislature to reach the reasonable standard.
We turn now to the question of whether or not the interests of other
countries such as Canada, Mexico, or the European Union, outweigh the
interests of the United States when addressing the issue of whether
legislation which has extraterritorial effects are reasonable. We first can
compare, and quickly dismiss, the notion that the interests of the Cuba
outweigh those of the United States. The only interest Cuba has is in
profiting from property that has been illegally confiscated from the United
States." Such interests, compared with those of the United States, are not
legitimate. The United States and its nationals have a compelling interest
(h) The likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
80. Id.
81. See Brice M. Clagett, Tie III of the Helms Burton Act is Consistent with International
Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434 (1996).
82. See Shamberger, supra note 7, at 522.
83. Id. at 523.
84. Id. at 522.
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in getting back property that rightfully belongs to them."5 This interest
substantially outweighs any kind of interest that the Cuban government
might have in trying to continue its illegal trafficking of confiscated
property.
The more interesting situation arises when comparing the interests of
the United States with those of the European Union, Mexico, and Canada.
There is a closer argument that the interests of the European Union,
Mexico, and Canada outweigh those of the United States. However, there
is no mistaking the fact that the United States has an interest in not
allowing foreign nations to continue to profit at the expense of the United
States. 6  These foreign nations that are profiting from United States
confiscated property are fully aware that the Castro government seized
those properties without compensating the United States nationals for the
property." These foreign nations argue that their interests lie in their
ability to continue to conduct trade and business with Cuba free from the
laws of the United States.u Yet, what these nations do not seem to
understand is first, that the Helms-Burton Act is not a complete ban upon
countries that want to do business with the Cuban government. Rather it is
a measure taken to protect the interests of United States nationals who have
lost their ownership rights to property in Cuba, simply because of the
desperado tactics of the Castro government.
These nations that argue that their rights to freely deal with the Cuban
government are hindered by Helms-Burton are only partially correct,
because Helms-Burton is called into effect when these foreign nations
begin to traffic in property which was illegally confiscated from United
States nationals." There is not one provision within the Helms-Burton Act
which bans any and all trades with Cuba. It only bans those trades and
dealings which implicate directly properties that were confiscated from
United States nationals."0 To further illustrate the substantial interest the
United States has in passing such legislation, the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission recently announced that the United States nationals
possess claims to confiscated property that exceeds six billion dollars."
Clearly that number will continue to rise as long as the Castro government
is allowed to profit from those illegal activities.
85. See Clageu, supra note 81, at 436.
86. See Shamberger, supra note 7, at 524.
87. Id. at 524.
88. Id. at 523.
89. See generally Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5.
90. See generally id.
91. See Shamberger, supra note 7, at 522.
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Lastly, it is a well recognized principle in international law that
confiscations in violation of international law are ineffective in passing
valid title to the property. Therefore, the countries do not have an
obligation to recognize the passing of the title to the subsequent purchaser
of title. Therefore, the United States can claim that its interests
substantially outweigh those of these other competing countries, inasmuch
as these competing companies do not have free and clear title to
confiscated property. In the event these countries continue to traffic in
those properties, they are assuming the risk of purchasing property that
they know is confiscated illegally."
IV. CONCLUSION
The Helms-Burton Act, as it is in place right now, is a great piece of
legislation which quite frankly is being misused, or rather unused. While
Title III continues to be suspended by the President, the Helms-Burton Act
is nothing more than political posturing by the current administration, and
an extension of the 1959 Trade Embargo. It would be shameful to think
that Congress drafted a piece of legislation which does nothing more than
address an issue which has already been addressed. Indeed, it seems an
improbability to think that Congress intended to make Helms-Burton a
mere extension. Rather, it is clear from the language within the Helms-
Burton Act itself that it was intended to be the final blow to the Cuban
regime. Our leaders have an obligation to the citizens of this country.
The obligations the country owes its people are promulgated by the United
States Constitution, which states:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution of the United States of America."
The obligation to provide for the common defense, and establishment of
Justice, is for the citizens of this country and not for the benefit of trading
partners.
The Helms-Burton Act is the vehicle by which a final period can be
placed on the Castro regime. However, it is up to our great leaders to step
92. See id. at 525.
93. See Claget, supra note 81, at 437.
94. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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to the forefront and ensure that such a result will occur. This great nation
was founded upon an ideology of non-compliance with tyranny and
oppression. The Castro government has time and again proven that
tyranny and oppression shall be the standards by which they shall be
measured, and defiantly dare the United States government to act. The
legislature has acted and now it is up to the President of the United States
to put the final nail in the Castro government, and bring an end to the
tyrant's regime. Great leaders are measured by what great things they did
in their time of ruling. President Truman during World War II saw an end
to the Adolf Hitler rule. President George Bush saw the mighty fall of the
Communist Soviet Union and an influx of democracy to that region. The
fall of the Castro regime would have the same if not greater historical
accolades, and it is now the time for the current administration to do
everything within their power to bring the tyrant's regime to an end.
